Tele-tribunal
Clearly in the throes of what has been called by some “the El Salvador option”, the American-trained Iraqi counter-insurgency has developed its second front in an dishearteningly unsurprising place: television. Unsurprising, that is, if we accept the notion of an El Salvador style drama currently playing out in Iraq, from whence by definition the so-called counter-insurgency is little more than an American-funded and trained death squad. Death by television: it’s in the American modern war manifesto.
Incidentally, the propaganda piece/reality show “Terrorism in the Grip of Justice” is apparently quite popular in Iraq, though this is at best hearsay coming from me. TGJ is aired on the state-run Al Iraqiya network, akin to public television in the US. It is apparently the only source of televised news in Iraq that does not require a satellite dish. Now, Al Iraqiya is part of a media conglomeration called The Iraqi Media Network, created by the U.S. Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance in Iraq, which later became the Coalition Provisional Authority, after the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. However, the IMN, apparently now in the hands of the Iraqi government (see the editor’s note in this Christian Science Monitor article) has since its inception “faced credibility issues and was too closely associated with the CPA…As early as June 2003, the CPA was engaging in censoring Iraqi media, issuing ‘guidelines’ for all media outlets in Iraq, forbidding them from inciting violence or opposition to the occupation authority…Several seasoned journalists were reported to have quit the IMN out of frustration with CPA oversight. ‘Critics say the network’s mission is weakened by its contradictory goals. So far IMN is touted as both the voice of an occupying military force and an inspiration for Iraqis to produce fair and balanced news coverage. But many Iraqis have already dubbed the network a propaganda organ.’” (@sourcewatch)
The show itself consists of detainees confessing to various crimes; not only to terrorism-specific style crimes such as murder, but also to being homosexuals or paedophiles [source], sometimes showing obvious signs of having been recently beaten, and almost always before being taken to trial.
An extremely interesting account of this show-device comes from Peter Maass, who was in the room with General Adnan Thabit, the leader of Iraq’s most fearsome counterinsurgency force, the Special Police Commandos, and creator of TGJ:
Those being interrogated on the program do not look fearsome; these are not the faces to be found in the propaganda videos that turn up on Web sites or on Al Jazeera. The insurgents, or suspected insurgents, on ”Terrorism in the Grip of Justice” come off as cowardly lowlifes who kill for money rather than patriotism or Allah. They tremble on camera, stumble over their words and look at the ground as they confess to everything from contract murders to sodomy. The program’s clear message is that there is now a force more powerful than the insurgency: the Iraqi government, and in particular the commandos, whose regimental flag, which shows a lion’s head on a camouflage background, is frequently displayed on a banner behind the captives.
Before the show began that evening, Adnan’s office was a hive of conversation, phone calls and tea-drinking. Along with a dozen commandos, there were several American advisers in the room, including James Steele, one of the United States military’s top experts on counterinsurgency. Steele honed his tactics leading a Special Forces mission in El Salvador during that country’s brutal civil war in the 1980’s. Steele’s presence was a sign not only of the commandos’ crucial role in the American counterinsurgency strategy but also of his close relationship with Adnan. Steele admired the general. ”He’s obviously a natural type of commander,” Steele told me. ”He commands respect.”
Things quieted in the office once the episode of ”Terrorism in the Grip of Justice” began. First, a detainee admitted to having homosexual relations in a mosque. Then several other suspected insurgents made their confessions; two of them had been captured by Adnan’s commandos in Samarra, and their confessions were taped, just hours before, in this very office. Adnan sat smoking Royals and watching the show like a proud producer.
”It has a good effect on civilians,” he had told me, through an interpreter. ”Most civilians don’t know who conducts the terrorist activities. Now they can see the quality of the insurgents.” Earlier he said: ”Civilians must know that these people who call themselves resisters are thieves and looters. They are dirty. In every person there is good and bad, but in these people there is only bad.”
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