Overview

This early (1680) paper by Leibniz details a two-pronged theory of truth. Certain truths are necessary because their contraries are self-contradictory, and certain (existential) truths are necessary because of a free choice of God for the more perfect existence.

This theory seems to be meant to address a problem of freedom and determinism (or, as Leibniz calls it “future contingents”) - namely, because of the latter kind of truth, God can have future directed omniscience without future events being analytically necessary.

Outline

  1. Premises
    1. In God everything is spontaneous.
    2. It can “hardly be doubted” that people have free will.
    3. A volition is a conscious attempt to act, and an act necessarily follows from the will and ability to do it.
    4. If the conditions pro and con for an action exist, a volitional equilibrium is reached, and thus, a person won’t act.
  2. Analytic Propositions
    1. In every true proposition there is a connection between the subject and the predicate (”S is P”) and so every true proposition can be proved a priori.
    2. There are two primary propositions/truths:
      1. Necessary ones: whatever implies a contradiction is false. All truths of metaphysics (and logic, geometry, etc.) are necessary.
      2. Contingent ones: Whatever is more perfect or has more reason to be true.
    3. This cashes out to the idea that the principle of necessary truths is the principle that applies to essences, and the principle of contingent truths applies to existences.
  3. Modality into Freedom
    1. God is the only being whose existence is not contingent. Which is to say that his existence is analytically entailed by his essence.
    2. For most contingent things (x), x’s definition shouldn’t explain its existence, because if it did, its nonexistence would be a contradiction.
    3. Contingent things that exist do so because they are more perfect than the possible rivals for existence. Now, if x’s nonexistence is a contradiction, then it could not be the case that there are other competing possibilities qua existence.
    4. This means that we need a notion of possibility according to which some things are not necessary and do not actually exist.
    5. If this kind of possibility exists, it implies a certain freedom on the part of a free mind to choose one thing rather than another (for its perfection, as God does, or from our imperfection).
  4. Modality, God’s Actions and Existence
    1. God’s Free and Necessary Actions (God must have two types of actions)
      1. Example of a necessary action: God loves himself. This can be demonstrated from the definition of God.
      2. Example of a free action: God makes whatever is most perfect. There’s nothing contradictory in the contrary proposition (if it were, non-existent possibles would in fact be impossible).
    2. A similar conclusion (about modality) derives from the nature of existence:
      1. Take A and B. Only one of these can exist. Assume A is more perfect than B.
      2. Now, A exists because of this, and this fact can be demonstrated, or rendered certain by the nature of the case.
      3. If being certain were the same as being necessary, we’re in trouble.
      4. But, A’s existence has merely a hypothetical necessity. This means that it is necessary that if God always chooses what is most perfect, then A exists.
      5. This is to be distinguished from the (absolutely necessary-type) proposition that it is necessary that A exists.
      6. Again, if A were absolutely necessary, B would be impossible.
    3. So we must hold that:
      1. What has some degree of perfection is possible.
      2. What is more perfect than its opposite actually exists. (Perfection is an “urge for existence.”)
    4. This means that extant things are products of God’s will rather than of necessity.
    5. But: Does god will by necessity (because of his nature) or freely (because of his will)?
      1. It must be by necessity, since if he has to will to will something, this entails an infinite regress.
      2. Does this demean God? With Augustine: Such necessity is blessed.
  5. Possible Things
    1. So, things are possible even if God does not will them into existence, because they are not in themselves contradictions.
    2. Or, a possible thing is “something with some essence or reality, that is, something that can be clearly understood.”
    3. This means that if there is never an instantiation of a perfect circle, a circle is still possible, but just possesses less perfection (i.e. less reality) than the things that do exist.
    4. So that “No perfect circle ever did or will exist” is a necessary proposition is true, but “No perfect circle exists” (the timeless proposition) is a necessary proposition is false.
      1. This is so because Leibniz denies that the timeless proposition can be demonstrated.
      2. Basically, Leibniz wants to distinguish between propositions that cannot be solved because they are self-contradictory (e.g. find x where x^2=9 and x+5=9) and where they are merely possible/imaginary (e.g. find x where x^2 + 9 = 3x).
  6. Future Contingents
    1. This is meant to remove the problem about the foreknowledge of future contingents.
    2. God can formulate propositions about future contingents that are:
      1. necessary, given the state of the world that has “been settled once and for all”
      2. necessary, given the harmony of things.
    3. But future contingents are not necessary in the analytical sense. This lets God have foreknowledge of them even though they are not necessary.
    4. This entails that it is possible for the imperfect rather that the more perfect to exist. This is fine since we can accept “what God doesn’t will to exist doesn’t exist” without asserting the necessity of this proposition.
    5. [Near the end of this paper Leibniz has an incomplete sentence which he probably meant to turn into something saying:] The only existential proposition that is absolutely necessary is God exists.