Sorglose Nacht

Overview

In the Timaeus, Plato presents an elaborately wrought account of the formation of the universe. Plato is deeply impressed with the order and beauty he observes in the universe, and his project in the dialogue is to explain that order and beauty. The universe, he proposes, is the product of rational, purposive, and beneficent agency.

As Plato tells it, the beautiful orderliness of the universe is not only the manifestation of Intellect; it is also the model for rational souls to understand and to emulate. Such understanding and emulation restores those souls to their original state of excellence, a state that was lost in their embodiment.

Background

Despite some critical bickering, it is generally accepted that the Timaeus was written in the “late” period.

1. THE SETUP

   1. SOCRATES first recapitulates the main points he made the previous day (similar to those in “The Republic”, but unrecorded) to all present’s satisfaction. Apparently, today, Socrates was to listen, and CRITIAS and TIMAEUS were to tell.
   2. Critias suggests that he tell a lost story - and he swears it is factual - of the old Athenians. Socrates’ (unrecorded) account of perfect governance had brought it to his mind. In order for this story to be told, however, Critias will require a fairly long wind-up from Timaeus, which constitutes the entirety of this dialogue.
      1. Timaeus (an astronomer) will begin with the generation of the world and go up to the creation of men (inclusive, it turns out). Critias will take it from there, which he does in the next (eponymous) dialogue.
   3. In his prefatory remarks Timaeus describes the account he is about to give as a “likely account” (eikôs logos). This apology is clearly meant to lower our expectations: the account is no more than likely. It will take place it three substantive parts.
      1. The first two seem to actually be two separate accounts of the causes of the way the universe is: the divine and necessary causes, respectively.
      2. Finally, we will get an account of how this all comes to constitute the human.

2. THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE INTELLECT, PART 1: THE TELEOLOGICAL UNIVERSE

   1. Timaeus begins with a (now familiar) account of “what is and never becomes” (that which is apprehended by reason - the Forms, or the pattern) and vice versa (apprehended by opinion).
   2. Overview: The achievements here are those of the creation of the world, and “the intellect” here is God. Here is an overview of the argument for God:
      1. Some things always are, without ever becoming (27d6).
      2. Some things become, without ever being (27d6-28a1).
      3. If and only if a thing always is, then it is grasped by understanding, involving a rational account (28a1-2).
      4. If and only if a thing becomes, then it is grasped by opinion, involving unreasoning sense perception (28a2-3).[16]
      5. The universe is a thing that has become (28b7; from 5a-c, and 4).
         1. The universe is visible, tangible and possesses a body (28b7-8).
         2. If a thing is visible, tangible and possesses a body, then it is perceptible (28b8).
         3. If a thing is perceptible, then it has become (28c1-2; also entailed by 4).
      6. Anything that becomes is caused to become by something (28a4-6, c2-3).
      7. The universe has been caused to become by something (from 5 and 6).
      8. The cause of the universe is a Craftsman, who fashioned the universe after a model (28a6 ff., c3 ff.; apparently from 7, but see below).
      9. The model of the universe is something that always is (29a4-5; from 9a-9e).
         1. Either the model of the universe is something that always is or something that has become (28a5-29a2, also implied at 28a6-b2).
         2. If the universe is beautiful and the Craftsman is good, then the model of the universe is something that always is (29a2-3).
         3. If the universe is not beautiful or the Craftsman is not good, then the model of the universe is something that has become (29a3-5).
         4. The universe is supremely beautiful (29a5).
         5. The Craftsman is supremely good (29a6).
      10. The universe is a work of craft, fashioned after an eternal model (29a6-b1; from 8 and 9).
   3. Given familiar Platonic doctrines and assumptions, the argument up to the intermediate conclusion that the universe has a cause of its becoming (7) presents no particular difficulties. But 7 by itself gives only partial support to 8. Here it helps to anticipate 9d as a fundamental premise in Timaeus’ reasoning; it is not just the generation of any world, but that of a supremely beautiful one that Timaeus’ reasoning here - and in fact throughout the discourse - attempts to explain. That a world as beautiful as ours might be the effect of an unintelligent cause is a possibility that does not so much as cross Plato’s mind.
   4. The one-world entailment:
      1. If everything must have a cause, and hence the world was created (vi-iix) and
      2. since the artificer is good, it was created from the model of the eternal [note that this is a criterion for the goodness of God, and the alternative is blasphemy] (ix-x), then:
      3. Since it is created on the model of the beautiful (form), which is whole, the world is whole. Hence, there cannot be many worlds, but only one: ours.

3. THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE INTELLECT, PART 2: DIVINE PHYSICS

   1. Once the conclusion that the universe is teleologically structured is settled, the explanatory methodology of the discourse changes accordingly. The question can now be: Given that the world as a whole is the best possible one within the constraints of becoming and of Necessity, what sorts of features should we expect the world to have?
   2. Divine Physics: The world is created of several elements:
      1. Fire: Since visibility is a necessity for a world.
      2. Earth: Since tangibility is a necessity for a world.
      3. Air & Water: Because we need two more means to get three dimensions, which we need because the model of the world is three-dimensional.
      4. These four elements comprise a universe that is fashioned as a globe. A globe is the perfect form, as it is entirely self-sufficient.
      5. Finally, the universe gets a soul.
   3. The actual material creation of the universe was created by god using a pretty standard series of arithmetic means and exponential series of twos and threes [1,2,4,8]&[1,3,9,27].
      1. Once the matter of the universe is created, god sets it into motion, thus creating time (day and night, months, years).
      2. God then creates gods, who he charges to create air-things, water-things, and land-things.
      3. The gods, thus charged, fashioned bodies, and (per the teachings of meta-God) laid souls into the bodies. This embodiment confuses the souls (another familiar Platonic theme), anodyne to which we have sight, which, when combined with souls, allows philosophy.

4. AN ACCOUNT OF THE EFFECTS OF NECESSITY

   1. Overview: In addition to the divinely motivated creation of the universe, there seem to be some necessary causes. These are part and parcel to a (heretofore unmentioned) third ingredient of existence.
      1. Recall that the first two are the pattern on which it is fashioned and the things themselves which imitate the pattern. This is precisely the being/becoming distinction.
      2. In addition to these two, we also have “the receptacle”: namely, space itself, with whatever pre-deistically/rationally-ordered properties it has.
      3. Thus the thing that appears as fire here and now is not fire in its own right: its fieriness is only a temporary characterization of it. What, then, is that thing in its own right? In a difficult and controversial passage Timaeus proposes a solution: In its own right it is (part of) a totally characterless subject that temporarily in its various parts gets characterized in various ways. This is the receptacle - an enduring substratum, neutral in itself but temporarily taking on the various characterizations. The observed particulars just are parts of that receptacle so characterized.
      4. Think of the receptacle as filled space. As space, its role is to provide both three-dimensional extension and a specific location for any observable particular to be “in” at a given time: for any particular to be, it must be occupy some spatial location, though not necessarily the same one throughout. On the other hand, as the filling of that space, it serves as the neutral underlying substratum from which a particular, once characterized in some way, is constituted.
      5. An observable particular, then, is a bit of extended, localizable stuff that may be variously characterized at various times and in various places. It appears that the receptacle is intended to serve both as the matter from which observable particulars are constituted and as the spatial field or medium in which they subsist.
   2. The complete metaphysical position of the Timaeus is summed up here as (i) the eternal and unchanging forms, the “model,” or “father”; (ii) the copies of the model or “offspring” of the father and the mother (on our account, the observable particulars); and (iii) the receptacle, or “mother.”
   3. Now, the four elements (fire, earth, water, and air) are cyclical, one is always changing into the other, and so goes the world.
      1. There appears to be a question about whether these essences exist as such, or just structure existence. As soon as that is brought up, though, we are into describing the essences geometrically.
      2. I think the play here is that when God gives the world reason and measure, these substances are formalized (so to speak) into their correct geometries.
      3. On a side point, above we said that these elements are cyclically. But it is a misapprehension that they are cyclically generated. In fact, they all come from triangles.
   4. The geometries of the four substances:
      1. Fire: Tetrahedron (four triangular faces)
      2. Earth: Cube (six square faces)
      3. Water: Icosahedron (20 triangular faces)
      4. Air: Octahedron (eight triangular faces)
   5. If (a-c) constitute the discussion of matter, then what follows is the discussion of motion. This (like the above) ultimately is less interesting than what Plato is trying to do with all this (dated) speculation.
      1. Suffice it to say that the shapes infuse the interstices between each other and combine to form the media of all the senses: sight, touch, taste and hearing are discussed.
      2. In addition to filling the interstices, they can also break each other, for whatever that’s worth.

5. HOW INTELLECT AND NECESSITY COOPERATE TO PRODUCE THE CONSTITUTION OF HUMAN BEINGS: ETHICS

   1. This generally takes the form of how the elements combine to form the body (organs, bones, sinews, limbs, and so on) of the human person. Then the converse, from whence imbalances arise (diseases), and then on to what one should do to care for one’s soul.
   2. The stated thematic purpose of Timaeus’ discourse - sandwiched as it is between those of Socrates and Critias - is to provide an account of human nature (in the context of the nature of the universe as a whole) that, conjoined with Socrates’ previous account of education (à la Republic), will provide the basis for Critias’ forthcoming account of human virtue in action, as displayed by the deeds of the ancient Athenians.
      1. If we take this stated purpose seriously, we will expect the entire cosmological account to culminate in human psychology and ethics. And that is indeed what we find.
   3. In the passage that may fairly be taken as the climax of Timaeus’ discourse, human beings are urged to devote their utmost attention to the cultivation and preservation of the well being of their immortal, rational souls.
   4. The whole thing ends up somewhat anticlimactically with some fairly serious misogynist rhetoric: Women are presumed to have been created in the second generation of men - those who were cowards or led unrighteous lives were changed into women. Hence, perhaps, the conflation “to get fucked.”

A quick note: This ends our series of outlines of Platonic Dialogues. Next up: Aristotle.

Overview

Meno wants to know how virtue is learned (by teaching, practice).

Context

1. Platonic: The Meno is an early-Middle Platonic dialogue. It’s question, how - if at all - virtue is learned, is also addressed in Protagoras, with opposite results.

2. Contemporary: The Meno is also an important historical precedent with regard to the question of the Value of Knowledge. After all, if a true belief about the correct way to Larissa is surely of just as much practical use as knowledge of the way to Larissa — both will get us to our destination (7, below) — why do we find it so much more valuable?

   Plato’s thought seems to be that knowledge, unlike mere true belief, gives one a confidence that is not easily lost, and it is this property that accounts for the distinctive value of knowledge over mere true belief.

Outline

1. Socrates suggests that we’d have to know what virtue is before we know how it can be learned. He asks Meno to explain to him what he thinks virtue is.
   1. Meno says:
      1. A man’s virtue is his duty to the state, to help his friends and himself, and harm his enemies.
      2. A woman’s virtue is her duty to the house, and to obey her husband.
      3. Virtues are limitless, and each is relative to who we are (”actions and ages”).
   2. Socrates notes that this is no kind of definition of what “virtue” is. It is just a list of virtues. (Bees, health, strength analogies) He prods Meno tell him “a common nature” which makes virtues virtues.
   3. Meno feels that virtue is a special case.
2. Socrates lures Meno in with a plausible-sounding common denominator: “…can either house or state or anything be well ordered without temperance and without justice?”
   1. Forced into providing one definition, Meno suggests that, “virtue is the power of governing mankind.”
   2. Socrates: “Is virtue the same in a child and in a slave, Meno? Can the child govern his father, or the slave his master; and would he who governed be any longer a slave?”
   3. Socrates then suggests that perhaps “the power of governing justly” is the right track.
   4. Meno, ever thick, goes back to reciting virtues: Justice, temperance, magnanimity, which Socrates compares to (particular) shapes and colors: roundness, whiteness.
   5. Now, Socrates agrees to define his analogy (figure), if Meno will define virtue. He suggests that figure is “the limit of solid.”
   6. Meno now stalls; he demands Socrates define color before he (Meno) defines virtue.
      1. Socrates defines color as “colour is an effluence of form, commensurate with sight, and palpable to sense.” This is derivative from Gorgias and Empedocles, it is “orthodox”.
      2. Socrates finds it worse than his definition of a figure; Meno, inured to orthodox thinking, finds the opposite. (*Clarifying why may be instructive.)
3. Mutatis mutandis, Meno offers a quote from “the poet”, “Virtue is the desire of things honourable and the power of attaining them.”
   1. Socrates notes that this implies that some men desire good, and some desire evil. He asks Meno whether all men don’t desire good. Meno replies in the negative.
   2. Meno admits that some men mistakenly desire evil, thinking it is good.
   3. Meno must also admit that those who desire evil unmistakenly seem to be desiring to be miserable and ill-fated. (Evils being “hurtful to the possessor of them”). He must admit it seems unlikely that anyone would desire to be miserable and ill-fated.
   4. Socrates now notes that, the desire of good being common to all, Meno’s definition of virtue is reduced to the power of attaining good.
   5. Socrates now seems to equivocate between “the good” and “goods”. He asks Meno if the power of acquisition of goods by unjust means is virtuous, to which Meno must reply again in the negative.
   6. Socrates can now say that if Meno wants to keep his definition of virtue, he’s going to require some additional criteria: justice, temperance, etc. And with that, we’re back where we started.
   7. Actually, though, Socrates takes the tack that since we’ve already understood these to be parts of virtue (figures, e.g.): “can any one who does not know virtue know a part of virtue?” (Can we understand the universal simply by means of appeal to the particulars?) To which again Meno must reply no.
   8. Meno is now exhausted, and Socrates is ready to begin his positive investigation. Before that though, Meno introduces a question to Socrates, which we call:
4. Meno’s Paradox: “how will you enquire, Socrates, into that which you do not know? What will you put forth as the subject of enquiry? And if you find what you want, how will you ever know that this is the thing which you did not know?”
   1. Socrates then notes that Meno is occluding all possibility of enquiry, as if one knows something, one has no need to enquire, and if one doesn’t know something, one can’t know the subject for enquiry. Meno, needled to the point of witlessness by Socrates, will take this. But of course, Socrates won’t let him.
   2. Socrates appeals to those who speak wisely of divine matters, and further of an immortal soul in which all knowledge is already immanent, if nascent - enquiry and learning then, for Socrates, are matters of recollection.
   3. Meno isn’t buying it, and asks Socrates to prove it. Socrates calls over one of Meno’s (unlearned) attendants, and goes over some geometry, prodding the boy to do some deductions and teaching him terminology, during which he claims the boy is remembering pre-learned geometry, and not learning it. “Without any one teaching him he will recover his knowledge for himself, if he is only asked questions?”
      
      This is the diagram Socrates draws and uses to get the boy to remember his geometrical theorems.
   4. Now, Socrates implicitly compares the intellectual enrichment the boy just underwent at Socrates’ puzzling him to Meno’s own, and presents his apology for the Socratic method:
      

      …that we shall be better and braver and less helpless if we think that we ought to enquire, than we should have been if we indulged in the idle fancy that there was no knowing and no use in seeking to know what we do not know;- that is a theme upon which I am ready to fight, in word and deed, to the utmost of my power.

5. Agreed to sally forth and enquire into the nature of virtue, Meno once again sets forth his initial question, and this time, Socrates reticently concedes to discuss it without knowing first the essence of virtue.
   1. Socrates hypothesizes here that knowledge alone is taught, so only if virture is knowledge will virtue be taught.
   2. The minor premise of Socrates’ syllogism here is that virtue is good. To which Meno agrees. This leads Socrates to the conclusion that “if knowledge embraces all good,” then virtue must be knowledge.
   3. Then by a piece of rather dubious argumentation, Socrates suggests a second syllogism: p1) that virtue makes us good, p2) that all good things are profitable, so c) virtue is profitable.
   4. Socrates notes that many of the things we think of as being profitable (health, strength, beauty and wealth) may also sometimes lead us to harm. Further the “goods of the soul” (temperance, justice, courage, quickness of apprehension, memory, magnanimity, etc.) can equally be both profitable and hurtful - depending on whether they are practiced under the guidance of wisdom or folly.
   5. “If then virtue is a quality of the soul, and is admitted to be profitable, it must be wisdom or prudence” (e.g. that thing that tempers the goods of the soul). “And thus we arrive at the conclusion that virtue is either wholly or partly wisdom”.
   6. Unfortunately for Meno, Socrates now suggests that a) the good are made good by instruction, and b) if “virtue is knowledge, there can be no doubt that virtue is taught”, and c) that to be taught something needs teachers. Socrates’ experience doesn’t suggest that these teachers exist.
6. At which point, Socrates brings ANYTUS (whose father is a paragon of Greek virtue) into the conversation.
   1. Socrates asks Anytus whether it makes sense to send someone looking to learn a skill to one who professed to teach it (an apprenticeship). Anytus agrees that it does.
   2. Socrates now then reminds us that those who profess to teach virtue are called the Sophists. Anytus recoils: “By Heracles, Socrates, forbear!”
   3. Socrates here plants the idea that “Of all the people who profess that they know how to do men good, do you mean to say that these are the only ones who not only do them no good, but positively corrupt those who are entrusted to them, and in return for this disservice have the face to demand money?”
   4. Now Socrates and Anytus engage in a coversation about THEMISTOCLES, a man they agree was a virtuous man. They end up agreeing (in that Socratic way) that his son was not quite the man his father was, despite his apparent capacity. Other examples are cited. Particular note is made that while these good men teach their sons things like music, gymnastics and horseback riding, they don’t seem to be able to teach them virtue.
   5. Socrates concludes thus that virtue cannot be taught. But, paradoxically, virtuous men appear to have knowledge of right and good action. At any rate, they must /perform/ right and good action, definitionally.
7. Socrates suggests that the answer to this problem is that “true opinion is as good a guide to correct action as knowledge.” (Example of the guides to Larissa). Further, he suggests that knowledge is just right opinion, but bound through recollection (anamnesis) - that is, giving an account of its truth. It is in this way that knowledge attains its “stabilizing” character (contra true belief).
   1. They now just agree (with no argument) that right opinion is not given by nature (is not innate).
   2. Now, all his arguments established, Socrates delivers his opinion:
      1. Virtue is not knowledge since it can’t be taught.
      2. Since it’s not knowledge, it must stem from right opinion.
      3. Right opinion doesn’t come from nature.
      4. Thus, virtue comes neither from nature nor is it acquired, rather, it seems to be “divined” - that is, given by God to the virtuous.